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A B S T R A C T
This paper applies the gravity model to investigate the impacts of institutional quality coupled with political
risks, distance, and socio-economic factors on tourist flow. We find that institutional quality and absence of
conflict are driving factors in fostering tourism flows for both source and destination countries. Our findings
suggest that institutional reform can help boost the economies of countries with low-quality institutions. While
institutional change is a positive development in its own right, our results suggest that it can also have important
additional economic benefits for countries that are highly dependent on tourism.
1. Introduction
The tourism industry is one of the key drivers of economic growth
and development, that contributed US$7.6 trillion to the global
economy (10.2% of the global GDP) and generated 292 million jobs (1
in 10 jobs on the planet) in 2016 (Travel and Tourism Economic Impact,
2017). The significant contribution of the tourism industry and many
economies' increased dependency on its revenues warrant a detailed
analysis of the underlying factors and trends that drive this industry.
Most studies focus on economic determinants of tourism (e.g. national
income, relative price, and travel cost) (Crouch, 1994; Gray, 1970; Kim,
Saha, Vertinsky, & Park, 2018; Kim & Song, 2001; Lim, 1999; Socher,
1986). Another stream of literature focuses on inbound tourism, con-
sidering the impact of specific destination factors, such as heritage sites
(Su & Lin, 2014), travel risk (Fischhoff, De Bruin, Perrin, & Downs,
2004), and technology and infrastructure (Zhang & Jensen, 2007).
In our study, we are motivated to incorporate the role of quality of
governance and political risks to explain the demand of tourist inflow in
a number of ways. First, from a demand side perspective, poor in-
stitutional quality, including internal and external conflicts, confers a
negative international image of a country. Some empirical studies
document that conflict adversely determines the perception of the in-
ternational tourists (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006). In addition, tourists tend
to avoid poor governance areas and prefer areas that are otherwise less
attractive for tourism, but which have better governance (Araña &
León, 2008). Eilat and Einav (2004) document that the political risk of a
destination country is a crucial consideration in tourism. Thus, poor
governance quality coupled with higher political risk is detrimental to
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the growth of the tourism industry. Prior literature also argues that
political risk and poor governance adversely affect the supply side of
the industry (Hyndman, 2015; Saha & Yap, 2014). The prevalence of
political turbulence can cause a significant number of service providers
and operators in the tourism sector to suspend business activities. Prior
studies document that military involvement in politics hinders the
growth of tourism industry due to the absence of peace and security
(Hyndman, 2015; Khalid, Okafor, & Aziz, 2019; Saha & Yap, 2014). In
addition, religious conservatives in the political paradigm potentially
hinder the growth of the tourism industry.
These studies are generally more expedient for researchers to un-
dertake due to the ready availability of data. There is also a growing
literature exploring the more complex and nebulous dimension of po-
litical impacts on tourism, including nations' territorial integrity, se-
curity, political stability, peacefulness, and institutions, all of which
play an important role in influencing tourist inflows (Ballia, Shahzad, &
Salah Uddin, 2018; Cothran & Cothran, 1998; Demir & Gozgor, 2018;
Edgell, DelMastro Allen, Smitch, & Swanson, 2013; Goeldner & Ritchie,
2003; Kim et al., 2018). The threat of terrorism, domestic violence or
outright civil conflict, have an especially negative effect on tourist in-
flows (Fratianni & Kang, 2006; Hall & O'Sullivan, 1996; Neumayer,
2004; Thompson, 2011; Yap & Saha, 2013). In contrast, the evidence on
the effect of institutional quality, and corruption in particular, is mixed.
While some find evidence of a negative effect of corruption (Poprawe,
2015; Yap & Saha, 2013), others argue that corruption may in fact fa-
cilitate rather than hinder business activity (Huntington, 1968; Leff,
1964).
This study re-examines the effect of institutional quality and poli-
tical risk on tourism in the context of the gravity model, which has
become a standard tool for analyzing trade flows (Head & Mayer,
2014). It has also been applied to flows of capital and labor. In its most
basic form, it explains bilateral trade flows with the economic sizes of
the two countries and the distance between them. It is often augmented
to account for the nature of the relationship between countries, such as
contiguity, common language or colonial legacy, and the presence of
preferential relations. As trade relationships are inherently bilateral, the
gravity model is a superior tool for analyzing the determinants of trade
flows than models based on total trade flows.
We contribute to the tourism literature in a number of ways. First,
our study is comprehnesive in covering a large data set for 134 coun-
tries of origin and 31 destination countries. Second, we assess the re-
lative roles economic determinants of tourist flows, geography, political
risk, and institutional quality on the tourist flows. Third, our findings
are robust over basic and augmented gravity models, including the
Hausman-Taylor (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) and Poisson Pseudo-Max-
imum Likelihood approaches. Finally, our findings demonstrate that
institutional quality, conflict, and government stability are important
determinants to explain the tourist flows from 134 countries of origin to
31 destination countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly
discusses the existing literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4
describes the model specifications and the econometric methodology.
The results are presented in Section 5, while the conclusions are pre-
sented in Section 6.
2. Literature review
Institutions include formal and informal norms that determine how
people behave to one another (North, 1990). Good institutions are
conducive to economic growth and development, because they foster
trust and cooperation, encourage investment, and deter free riding and
rent seeking. Bad institutions tend to translate into economic stagna-
tion, graft, and political instability. There is plentiful evidence that
institutional quality is one of the main determinants (if not the main
factor) of differences in economic development across countries
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2002; Hall & Jones, 1999).
Whether institutional quality should have any significant impact on
the economies of tourism-dependent countries is less obvious. Tourists,
especially those travelling to less-developed countries, typically only
visit specific areas, stay for relatively short periods of time, and engage
only in relatively simple economic exchanges with the local population
and business sector. Moreover, countries that treat their own citizens
rather poorly with respect to institutional quality and political rights
can nevertheless successfully shield tourists from the adverse effects of
poor institutions and ensure their access to all modern conveniences.
The small yet lively tourism industry in North Korea, one of the most
repressive countries in the world, is a prime example of such an ap-
proach: tourists who abide by basic preannounced rules are granted
material comforts and free from repression. It is therefore an open
question whether tourism-dependent countries lose much by not im-
proving institutional quality.
The small but growing literature exploring aspects of the nexus
between tourism and institutional quality can be classified into two
major strands. The first strand argues that domestic institutional quality
is a crucial determinant in attracting international tourist inflow, which
eventually promotes economic growth. Empirical investigations docu-
ment that institutional quality in potential destination countries is an
important determinant of inbound tourism (Aas, Ladkin, & Fletcher,
2005; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Goeldner & Ritchie, 2003).
Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) studied the impact of terrorism on
tourism in Spain and other Western countries, suggesting that three to
nine months could often pass before tourist arrivals decreased drasti-
cally, although this reflects the intrinsic lag effect due to travel agency
packages, particularly prior to the era of online booking (i.e. prior to
the 2000s, people may have already booked and paid for holidays in
countries that subsequently experienced increased violence, so that
arrivals start falling only after a delay reflecting a falloff in advanced
bookings immediately following terrorist incidents). Hall and
O'Sullivan (1996, p. 117) argue that tourist visitation is profoundly
affected by ‘perceptions of political instability and violence’. Violent
protests, social unrest, civil war, tourist actions, the perceived viola-
tions of human rights or perceived threats to these activities can all
serve to the cause tourists to alter their behavior. Besides the institu-
tional factors, branding destination image (Shams, 2016a), and the
capacity of host stakeholders (Shams, 2016b, 2016c, 2017) are also
important determinants that tourists consider.
The second strand of literature argues that high institutional quality
can actually be detrimental to tourist inflow. For instance, the effects of
corruption on tourism are manifold, and are not necessarily only ne-
gative (Dutt & Traça, 2010). For instance, corruption may facilitate
business activity, thus increasing the speed or ‘velocity’ of money, and
hence the speed of business transactions. In this respect, corruption may
sometimes have positive side-effects for tourists, who make arrange-
ments or enjoy products that might not have been possible without the
payment of bribes or tips; such tourism is generally associated with
illicit and criminal activities (e.g. gambling and prostitution).
A large volume of studies investigated the most appropriate
econometric specification for analyzing tourism (Eilat & Einav, 2004;
Etzo, Massidda, & Piras, 2014; Massidda & Etzo, 2012; Song & Li, 2008;
Song, Witt, & Li, 2009; Um & Crompton, 1990; Witt & Witt, 1995;
Wong, 1997a, 1997b; Wong, Song, & Chon, 2006). Although there was
a tendency to neglect the gravity model in recent literature, it is coming
back into use for modelling tourism flows, particularly in circumstances
where there is a need to include and evaluate the role of structural
factors. A few recent studies applied the gravity model in explaining
tourist flows (e.g., Gallego et al.,2016; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2008;
Yang & Wong, 2012; and Eryiğit, Kotil, & Eryiğit, 2010). For instance,
Santana Gallego et al., (2016) documented that the bilateral tourist
flows enhance trade between countries. Khadaroo and Seetanah (2008)
applied the gravity model to investigate the role of transport infra-
structure in attracting tourists. Yang and Wong (2012) assessed the
impact of cultural distance on inbound tourist flows to China. The study
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found that social axioms are a barrier to international travel. Eryiğit
et al. (2010) documented that distance negatively affects tourist inflow
to Turkey. The study also highlighted that tourism climate index plays
an important role in explaining the tourist flow between Turkey and
other countries. However, these studies overlooked the role of institu-
tional and political risk in their gravity frameworks. Keum (2010) ex-
plores the validity of the gravity equation to explain the patterns of
international tourism flows, while Archibald, LaCorbinière, and Moore
(2008) employ a dynamic gravity model to measure the competitive-
ness of Caribbean tourism markets. Gravity models have been used to
investigate the impact of mega-events (i.e. cultural and sports under-
takings) on tourist inflows into the host-country/region (Fourie &
Santana-Gallego, 2011). Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2013) studied
determinants that drive inbound tourism arrivals in Africa from outside,
and from elsewhere within Africa. They find that factors affecting
African-inbound and African-internal tourism are quite similar to those
affecting global tourist flows, such as income, distance, and land area.
Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martinez-Serrano (2007a, 2007b) report
that common language, as well as the presence of embassies and con-
sulates, are important factors attracting tourist arrivals from G7 coun-
tries.
3. Data
In order to measure the impact of institutional quality and political
risk on tourism, we use data from 131 tourist origin countries1 and the
top 34 destination2 countries over the period 2005–2014 (Table 1). We
select our sample countries based on the availability of the data. Our
dependent variable is tourist arrivals (LNTR) obtained from the UN
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2015) dataset. UNWTO (2015)
defines a ‘tourist’ as an ‘overnight visitor’, whereas ‘visitor’ refers to a
broader concept, which includes both tourists and same-day visitors
(e.g. cruise passengers). UNWTO takes great care to reconcile differ-
ences in national data collection on tourism to publish an annual
summary of all tourism flows among countries. A set of macroeconomic
indicators is drawn from the World Development Indicators published
by the World Bank (2014). The gravity variables are provided by the
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII,
2014), including bilateral distance, and dummies for common culture
and common borders.
To measure institutional quality, this study relies on the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2018) country risk composite
score. The ICRG provides detailed monthly data for 140 developed,
emerging, and frontier markets since December 2003 (Hoti, McAleer, &
Shareef, 2005). The ICRG database contains 22 variables explaining
three components of country risk—economic, financial and politi-
cal—whereby 12 variables represent the political component, and 5
each represent the economic and financial components. The scores
range from 0 to 12, with higher scores representing lower risks (and
thus a more favorable institutional environment). As we are primarily
interested in the effect of political risk and institutional quality on
tourism flows, we use the following political-risk indexes:
(1) Government stability (GS); (2) Military in politics (MP); (3)
Socio-economic conditions (SC); (4) Religion in politics (RP); (5)
Investment profile (IP); (6) Law & order (LO); (7) Internal conflict
(IC); (8) Ethnic tensions (ET); (9) External conflict (EC); (10)
Democratic accountability (DA); (11) Corruption (CC); (12)
Bureaucracy quality (BQ).
Principal components analysis (PCA) is used, followed by varimax
rotation to resolve the problem with high correlations between some of
these indexes. On standard eigenvalue-based criteria, whereby we
choose principal components with eigenvalues> 1, we retain three
components which, between them, explain almost 71% of total var-
iance. Table 2 lists the principal components, whilst Fig. 1 shows the
relative component loadings.3
The first component, which we call ‘institutional quality’, is corre-
lated with socio-economic conditions, bureaucracy quality (with factor-
loading>0.4), investment profile, corruption, law and order (> 0.3),
and military-in-politics. The second component represents cultural
conflict, as it is highly correlated with religious tensions, ethnic ten-
sions, internal and external conflicts/tensions. The last component re-
presents public accountability, and government stability with a nega-
tive value. Hence, we can say that the higher values indicate a greater
degree of government stability, but a lower degree of democratic ac-
countability. We allocate the values of these three indexes to the des-
tinations and origins of tourist flows.
4. Methodology
This section is based on the pioneering work of three previous
studies: Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Serlenga and Shin (2007),
and Culiuc (2014). Given the nature of our data, we apply the gravity
model in explaining the role of institutional quality on tourist inflow,
following Morley, Rosselló, and Santana-Gallego (2014) and Culiuc
(2014). Gravity model assumes that the bilateral relationship between
two countries can be modelled as a multiplicative function of the eco-
nomic masses of the two economies (i.e. in terms of incomes, ex-
penditures, or endowments), the inverse of economic distance (trade
costs, investment costs, or migration costs), and some constant, akin to
the eponymous Law of Gravity postulated by Isaac Newton:






where Mot.and Mdt are the mass (economic size) variables of the origin
and destination, respectively, and Dod denotes the distance between the
origin and destination.
Besides the main variables of gravity (mass variables), most studies
include additional dummy variables to consider the social, geographical
and political factors such as common language or border etc.
After taking logs, the gravity model of tourism takes the following
form (Culiuc, 2014, p. 10):
= + + + + + = …ln T B ln P B ln P B ln D B X η ε T1odt ot dt od A odt t odt1 2 3 (2)
1 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,P.R.: Mainland, China,P.R.:Hong Kong,
Colombia, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, I.R. Of, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Norway,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zimbabwe.
2 Angola, Malawi, Armenia, Malaysia, Bahamas, The Mexico, Botswana,
Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Peru, Canada, Philippines, Cyprus, Portugal,
Dominican Republic, South Africa, Ethiopia, Spain, France, Sri Lanka, Guinea,
Suriname, Indonesia, Thailand, Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, Israel, Ukraine,
Jamaica, United States, Zambia.
3 The descriptive statistics for the political risk variables are presented in
Appendix 1, while the remaining variables in the analysis are summarized in
Appendix 2. The scoring coefficients are given in Appendix 3.
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where PYot and PYdt are the populations of the origin-country and
destination-country, respectively, and are used as measures of the
economic size of the two countries. Gravity models of trade flow usually
measure country mass by using GDP. We use population, since our
dependent variable is tourism flow (number of visitors) rather than the
monetary value of tourist services. As before, Dod is the distance be-
tween the two countries. Xodtis a 1× k vector of other factors, and ηt is a
set of T year dummies capturing common time effects.
However, the specification in Eq. (2) suffers from omitted-variables
bias, as mentioned by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), because it
captures only the characteristics of origin and destination, without
taking into account the reasons (i.e. the ‘attractiveness’) motivating the
flows that occur from o to d, as compared to flows going from o to other
destinations. As bilateral flows are based on multilateral parameters,
Table 1
Variable, definition and source.
Variable Label Measure Source Study
Tourist arrivals LNTR Log of tourist arrivals to destination-country from the origin-country. WTO Kim et al. (2018)
Gravity variables
Gross domestic product per capita of
destination
LGDPCD Log of gross domestic product per capita of the destination-country. WDI Crescimanno, Galati, and Yahiaoui
(2013)
Gross domestic product per capita of origin LGDPCO Log of gross domestic product per capita of the origin-country. WDI Crescimanno et al. (2013)
Geographic variables
Distance between countries in pair LDIST Log of the distance between countries in the pair as a proxy of
transport costs.
CEPII Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2013)




Common language COMLN Dummy variable: both countries in the pair have the same language. CEPII Gil-Pareja et al. (2007a)
Common legal origins COMLEGO Binary variable that takes value one if the two countries in a country-
pair have the same legal origins.
CEPII Gil-Pareja et al. (2007a)
Population size of destination-country LPOPD Population size for destination-country. WDI Kim et al. (2018)
Population size of origin-country LPOPO Population size for origin-country. WDI




Institutional quality PC1 The first component, called the institutional quality. Kim et al. (2018).
Conflict culture PC2 The second component, called conflict culture. ICRG
Public accountability and government
stability





Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5.7194 4.1166 0.4766 0.4766
Comp2 1.60277 0.4642 0.1336 0.6102
Comp3 1.1385 0.21655 0.0949 0.7051
Comp4 0.922017 0.324344 0.0768 0.7819
Comp5 0.597673 0.158717 0.0498 0.8317
Comp6 0.438956 0.0365617 0.0366 0.8683
Comp7 0.402394 0.0577924 0.0335 0.9018
Comp8 0.344602 0.0903113 0.0287 0.9305
Comp9 0.254290 0.0224054 0.0212 0.9517
Comp10 0.231885 0.0290877 0.0193 0.9710
Comp11 0.202797 0.0581637 0.0169 0.9879



























0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Component 1
Component loadings
Fig. 1. Component loadings.
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one way of dealing with the problem of multilateral parameters is to
introduce dummies for origin countries and for destination countries,
whereby the specification then becomes:
= + + + + + + +ln T B ln P B ln P B ln D B X ω δ η εodt ot dt od A odt o d t odt1 2 3
(3)
where ωo and δd are origin and destination dummy variables, respec-
tively.
The inclusion of country of origin/destination dummy variables
implies that we are not able to estimate the coefficients of time-in-
variant country variables, such as geographical ones (e.g. the surface
area of a country) in the gravity equation. This problem can be ad-
dressed by using a fixed-effects approach where the unit of observation
is the country-pair. When we introduce country-pair dummies, φod, the
regression becomes:
= + + + + + +lnT B ln P B ln P ln D B X ε η φBodt ot dt od A odt odt t od1 2 3 (4)
Egger (2002, 2005) and Culiuc (2014) suggest using the Hausman
and Taylor (1981) model (HTM), which allows estimating coefficients
on time-invariant variables by imposing assumptions on the en-
dogeneity/exogeneity of each variable. The HTM estimator has ad-
vantages over the fixed- and random-effects models, since it depends on
instrumental variables used for between and within the variation of the
strictly exogenous variables (Egger, 2002, 2005). On the other hand,
one of the disadvantages of the HTM estimator is the problem of how
one defines the endogeneity and exogeneity of variables. We treat GDP
per capita and population as endogenous. According to HTM, we can
divide the explanatory variables into four categories: time-varying
(Xit1); uncorrelated with individual effects αi and time-varying (Xit2)
correlated with αi; time-invariant (Zi1) uncorrelated with αi, i= o, d;
and time-invariant (Zi2) correlated with αi, as follows (Rault, Sova, &
Sova, 2007):







where β1and β2 are the coefficients for time-varying variables, γ1 and
γ2are the vectors of coefficients for time-invariant ones, θt is the time-
specific effect common to all units (applied to correct the impact of all
the individual invariant determinants), αi represents the individual ef-
fects that account for the effects of all possible time-invariant factors,
and ηodt is a zero mean idiosyncratic random disturbance uncorrelated
within cross-sectional units.
A particular problem is posed in the case of zero tourist flows.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) discuss how the logarithmic trans-
formation of the model is beset by difficulties in dealing with zero-trade
flows. They suggest an alternative way for estimating log-linearized
regressions that comes from the direct estimation of the multiplicative
form of the gravity equation, pointing out that this is the most natural
procedure, without the need of any further information on the pattern
of heteroskedasticity. The advantages of this model are that it deals
with the zero-trade flows problem, providing unbiased estimates in the
presence of heteroskedasticity, whereby all observations are weighted
equally, and the mean is always positive. The disadvantage is that it
may present limited-dependent variable bias when some observations
are censored (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006; Shepherd & Wilson, 2009;
Siliverstovs & Schumacher, 2009; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 2009).
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) present the gravity equation in the
exponential form:
= +T X β εexp( )odt odt od (6)
where Todt represents the bilateral trade between the country of origin o
and country of destination d, and Xodt is a vector of explanatory vari-
ables (some of which may be linear, some logarithmic, and some
dummy variables).
Therefore, we can introduce the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
















This is used to solve the following set of first-order conditions:




We thus compare the results of log-linear regressions (with fixed
effects for individual countries or country-pairs), Hausman-Taylor, and
Poisson models, in a gravity-equation setting with an extended set of
political-risk ICRG controls.
5. Results and discussion
First, we estimate three alternative specifications of the gravity
model: (a) in the first model, we consider the core variables of gravity
model, e.g. distance between origin and destination countries, and
population of both origin and destination countries; (b) in the second
model, we add economic, geographical, social indicators; and (c) in the
third model, we further extend the model to consider political-risk
variables. The analysis is based on 134 origin and 31 destination
countries during the period 2005–2014. Table 3 shows the descriptive
statistics.
As can be seen from the first column in Table 4, the GDP, distance,
and population of both countries strongly influence tourism flows.
Distance is estimated with a negative coefficient, which indicates that
an increase in distance reduces tourist flows. Our findings corroborate
Fourie and Santana-Gallego's (2013) observation that distance is in-
versely associated with tourist flows, as it is associated with costs. As
expected, the size of population and GDP per capita in both countries
are positively correlated with tourism flows.
Next, we augment the basic gravity equation by adding variables
capturing the nature and strength of ties between countries (third
column in Table 4). Common border, currency, and language exert a
positive influence on tourist inflow, while common colonizer is detri-
mental to it. Finally, we also add political-risk factors (third column).
Higher values of the first two principal components (institutional
quality and conflict) indicate better quality of institutions and lower
risk. Our results suggest that better institutions and lower risk of con-
flict in both origin and destination country alike translate into higher
tourist flow. Regarding the the third component, higher values are as-
sociated with lower degrees of democratic accountability: our results
imply that low accountability exerts a negative effect on tourist flows.
Our finding mirrors those of studies revealing strong evidence the
tourist flow being responsive to political risks factors (Araña & León,
2008; Eilat & Einav, 2004; Hyndman, 2015; Khalid et al., 2019; Pizam
& Mansfeld, 2006; Saha & Yap, 2014).
Table 5 presents the results after controlling for the origin and/or
destination fixed effects. Geographical distance again has a negative
impact on bilateral tourism flows. However, the significance of popu-
lation and output per capita vanishes: given that these factors generally
change little from year to year, their importance is picked up by the
fixed effects. Adding fixed effects also reduces the significance of
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tourist flow 19,926 8.2761 0.5754 7.4830 9.2315
Distance 19,926 8.8222 0.2073 8.6491 9.2250
GDP Origin 19,926 10.8931 0.2022 10.6550 11.2765
GDP destination 19,926 10.6525 0.0965 10.4795 10.7821
Population Destination 19,926 16.7676 0.4995 16.3224 17.7271
Population Origin 19,926 17.2082 0.8026 16.5050 18.7571
Rule of law 19,926 0.0528 0.3678 0.2691 0.7587
Conflicts 19,926 0.4047 0 0.4047 0.4047
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institutional variables, which is unsurprising, as institutions, although
not time-invariant, also tend to change little from year to year. The
coefficients of institutional quality index are positive and significant in
promoting tourism, whereas the significance of the remaining two
principal components disappears. Common border, common language,
and common legal origins again encourage tourism flows among
countries.
Finally, we add controls for time and country-pair effects jointly so
as to capture time-invariant factors, such as distance and common
border, as well as slowly changing factors such as trust and social lin-
kages (Papaioannou, 2009). We now also use the overall index of ICRG
variables, calculated as the sum of the 12 indicators for origin and
destination (PCO and PCD), in addition to the three principal compo-
nents, as shown in Table 6, whereby institutional quality is only im-
portant for destination countries. Interestingly, economic and demo-
graphic factors influence both origin and destination countries
similarly. These results highlight the stark fact that the success of a
tourism destinations in attracting tourists is in a great part determined
by the degree of its success in removing political risks and improving
the quality of governance, institutions, and other relevant public bodies
and services.
The results obtained with the Hausman-Taylor Model are shown in
Table 7. In the first regression we use all three political-risk variables for
origin and destination, then we add the principal components in-
dividually.
We can see that higher values of the first component (institutional
quality) for destination is positive and significant at the 1% level:
countries with better institutions attract more tourists. The remaining
institutional variables are not significant, except the conflict index in
origin-countries (the second principal component): greater numbers of
tourists originate from countries that enjoy low levels of religious ten-
sion and conflict. In all specifications, tourism increases when any two
countries have the same colonial background or share a common
border, common language, or common currency.
Economic factors (income) are more important for origin-countries
than for destination-countries: the coefficient of GDP per capita for
origin-countries is considerably higher than that for GDP per capita of
destination-countries. This is understandable: more affluent individuals
usually have more disposable income, thus they are better able to spend
Table 4









LDIST −0.923*** −0.969*** −0.546***
(0.0392) (0.0369) (0.0182)
LPOPD 0.842*** 0.727*** 0.812***
(0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0088)




























Constant −4.147*** −3.353*** −5.314***
(0.410) (0.470) (0.353)
Observations 19,926 19,926 19,926
R–squared 0.439 0.570 0.798
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1
No time- or country-fixed effects included.
Dependent variable is Tourist arrivals (LNTR). Control variables: GDP per ca-
pita of the destination (LGDPCD); GDP per capita of the origin (LGDPCO);
Population of destination (LPOPD) Population of origin (LPOPO); Distance
(LDIST); Common border (COMBR); Common language (COMLN); Common
legal origins (COMLEGO); Common colonizer (COMCOL); Institutional quality
(DPC1 and OPC1 for destination and origin), Conflict culture (DPC2 and OPC2);
and Public accountability and Government stability (DPC3 and OPC3).
Table 5







LDIST −1.414*** −1.413*** −1.421***
(0.0287) (0.0303) (0.024)
LPOPD −0.0784 −0.315 0.837***
(0.9380) (1.0570) (0.0060)
LPOPO 0.4210 0.769*** 0.6251
(0.5350) (0.0117) (0.5680)
LGDPCD 0.3230 0.320 0.0228**
(0.2810) (0.345) (0.0109)
LGDPCO 0.3510 −0.00414 0.6020*
(0.3380) (0.0083) (0.3660)
COMBR 1.4180*** 1.4401*** 1.5602***
(0.1270) (0.1271) (0.1261)
COMLN 0.8341*** 0.6401*** 0.6131***
(0.0560) (0.0522) (0.0533)
COMCOL 0.1720** −0.1650** 0.3561***
(0.0771) (0.0804) (0.0754)
COMCUR −0.1890* −0.3260*** −0.1360
(0.1050) (0.115) (0.102)
COMLEGO 0.237*** 0.331*** 0.282***
(0.0394) (0.0411) (0.0422)
DPC1 0.1181** 0.0861* 0.4571***
(0.0742) (0.0973) (0.0095)
DPC2 0.1021* 0.1270 0.1670***
(0.106) (0.115) (0.0143)
DPC3 0.00964 0.0422 −0.113***
(0.0414) (0.0479) (0.0199)
OPC1 0.0200* 0.539*** 0.0425
(0.0947) (0.0100) (0.106)
OPC2 −0.0300 0.170*** −0.00482
(0.0912) (0.0162) (0.0985)
OPC3 0.0248 −0.201*** 0.0343
(0.0456) (0.0153) (0.0492)
Constant 3.759 6.893 −13.49
(16.79) (14.85) (10.69)




Origin effects yes no Yes
Observations 19,926 19,926 19,926
R-squared 0.860 0.801 0.820
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Dependent variable is Tourist arrivals (LNTR). Control variables: GDP per ca-
pita of the destination (LGDPCD); GDP per capita of the origin (LGDPCO);
Population of destination (LPOPD) Population of origin (LPOPO); Distance
(LDIST); Common border (COMBR); Common language (COMLN); Common
legal origins (COMLEGO); Common colonizer (COMCOL); Institutional quality
(DPC1 and OPC1 for destination and origin), Conflict culture (DPC2 and OPC2);
and Public accountability and Government stability (DPC3 and OPC3).
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a greater amount of money on travel. In the HTM specifications, we find
that distance has no significant influence on tourism flows.
Finally, we also estimate our model by applying the Poisson esti-
mator with clustered standard errors, since the coefficients from OLS
regressions can be questionable in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Our estimation also allows clusters within country-pairs to address the
issues of over-dispersion associated with Poisson distributions as well as
serial correlation. Table 8 shows that the PPML estimation results are
similar to the pooled OLS results. GDP per person and population size
continue to have significant positive impacts on tourism flows, although
the coefficients in each case become smaller. Common language and
common border are important determinants of tourism in all five re-
gressions. Our findings confirm those of Gil-Pareja et al. (2007a,
2007b), who reported that common language, as well as the presence of
embassies and consulates, are important factors attracting tourist arri-
vals from G7 countries. In addition, the results show that better in-
stitutional quality and the lack of conflict both encourage tourism
flows.
6. Conclusions
This paper examined the roles played by institutional quality and
political risk as determinants of tourism flows using the gravity model
estimated with OLS, Hausman-Taylor, and PPML technique. To this
effect, we use principal component analysis to generate three
institutional-quality indexes, corresponding to institutional quality,
conflict, and government stability. All three estimation techniques in-
dicate that institutional quality is an important determinant of tourist
flows. This is especially the case for institutional quality and risk of
conflict. The estimated effects are stronger for the destinations of tourist
flows than for the countries of origin.
Our empirical investigation yields several interesting findings. First,
lower levels of political risk in the destination countries contribute to
increase tourism flows. Second, higher quality of institutions is a
driving factor promoting tourist inflows in destination countries. Third,
gravity factors like population size, GDP per capita, distance, common
border, and languages play important roles in explaining the tourist
flows.
Tourism receipts can form a considerable proportion of national
GDP, especially in developing countries (Faber & Cecile, 2019). Our
findings thus show that reducing political risk and improving institu-
tional quality can translate into significant economic gains for the
destination countries by helping increase the size of the tourism sector.
Importantly, these gains are additional to the other benefits that im-
provements in the quality of institutions and lower political risk bring
Table 6
Estimation results of the gravity equation with country-pair effects.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Logtourism Logtourism Logtourism
LPOPD 1.1581*** 0.7632*** 1.1405***
(0.310) (0.315) (0.302)
LPOPO 0.3981* 0.3151** 0.4142*
(0.230) (0.232) (0.2302)
LGDPCD 0.4021*** 0.339* 0.3381**
(0.132) (0.139) (0.137)


















Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −5.061*** −4.89*** −3.15***
(2.407) (1.644) (1.055)
Observations 19,926 19,926 19,926
R-squared 0.971 0.962 0.971
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *
p < .1.
Dependent variable is Tourist arrivals (LNTR). Control variables: GDP per ca-
pita of the destination (LGDPCD); GDP per capita of the origin (LGDPCO);
Population of destination (LPOPD) Population of origin (LPOPO); Distance
(LDIST); Common border (COMBR); Common language (COMLN); Common
legal origins (COMLEGO); Common colonizer (COMCOL); Institutional quality
(DPC1 and OPC1 for destination and origin), Conflict culture (DPC2 and OPC2);
and Public accountability and Government stability (DPC3 and OPC3).
Table 7
Hausman-Taylor model.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
logtourism logtourism logtourism logtourism
LPOPD 1.4101*** 1.023*** 1.431*** 1.232***
(0.0532) (0.0327) (0.0213) (0.0250)
LPOPO 1.0360*** 1.0350*** 1.1571*** 1.0321***
(0.0695) (0.0700) (0.0613) (0.0613)
LGDPCD 0.3271*** 0.3361*** 0.4103*** 0.4184***
(0.0753) (0.0758) (0.0724) (0.0734)
LGDPCO 1.096*** 1.1481*** 1.0408*** 1.0303***













LDIST 0.129 0.134 0.220 0.193
(0.209) (0.212) (0.209) (0.210)
COMLN 0.776** 0.878** 0.909** 0.968***
(0.357) (0.364) (0.362) (0.365)
COMCUR 2.513*** 3.215*** 3.814*** 3.812***
(0.661) (0.414) (0.688) (0.6541)
COMBR 3.237*** 3.310*** 3.5310*** 3.5132***
(0.582) (0.597) (0.591) (0.597)
COMLEGO 0.102 0.0988 −0.0181 0.00422
(0.225) (0.231) (0.227) (0.230)
COMCOL 1.008*** 1.031*** 1.141*** 1.148***
(0.258) (0.265) (0.261) (0.263)
Constant −46.92*** −48.19*** −48.65*** −49.22***
(3.198) (3.168) (3.136) (3.180)
Observations 19,926 19,926 19,926 19,926
Number of paired 1973 1973 1973 1973
Sargen test 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.08
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Dependent variable is Tourist arrivals (LNTR). Control variables: GDP per ca-
pita of the destination (LGDPCD); GDP per capita of the origin (LGDPCO);
Population of destination (LPOPD) Population of origin (LPOPO); Distance
(LDIST); Common border (COMBR); Common language (COMLN); Common
legal origins (COMLEGO); Common colonizer (COMCOL); Institutional quality
(DPC1 and OPC1 for destination and origin), Conflict culture (DPC2 and OPC2);
and Public accountability and Government stability (DPC3 and OPC3).
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about for the residents of less-developed countries.
Our results support a number of specific policy recommendations.
First, our paper identifies an additional channel through which im-
provements in institutional quality and political risk benefit economic
development. Therefore, governments in countries that are (or have
potential to be) dependant on tourism should strive to put in place
sound institutions and a stable political environment. Such reforms will
enable them to reap further gains from tourism industry. Second, our
findings confirm that common language and common currency sig-
nificantly raise tourist flows. Hence, governments should aim to support
communication technologies, promote video marketing, encourage the
teaching of major international languages, and maintain stable and
predictable exchange rates. These measures should help attract more
tourists from other countries. Finally, reducing political risk can be
achieved by improving bilateral diplomatic relationships, safety, and
security. The developing countries' governments should therefore
prioritize these areas. In this, our results are in line with the argument
of Cothran and Cothran (1998) who suggest that reductions in political
risk can play an important role in promoting tourism sector.
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